EUPopLink Country report - Hungary

This country report, prepared as part of the EUPopLink COST Action, examines the populism–Euroscepticism nexus in Hungary. It traces how Fidesz, in government since 2010, evolved from a pro-European liberal party into the dominant case of populist radical right Euroscepticism in the European Union, framing its conflicts with Brussels in sovereigntist, civilisational and nativist terms while remaining a net beneficiary of EU funds. The report situates Fidesz alongside other relevant actors—Jobbik and its successor Mi Hazánk on the radical right, the liberal Momentum, and the new centre-right challenger Tisza—and analyses their respective positions on European integration and how they responded to Brexit, COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, and Trump’s re-election. It further considers the strategic responses of pro-European opposition parties and the domestic and EU-level consequences of Fidesz’s “sovereignty-focused” Euroscepticism, including Article 7 proceedings, infringement procedures and rule of law conditionality. The report concludes with the watershed parliamentary elections of 12 April 2026, in which the pro-European Tisza Party ended sixteen years of Fidesz–KDNP rule, and reflects on what this signals for the future of the Hungarian populism–Euroscepticism nexus.

This article tells the story of how Hungary’s relationship with the European Union has changed since the country joined in 2004, and why this matters for the rest of Europe. When Hungary became an EU member, there was widespread public enthusiasm, and most Hungarians have continued to see membership as good for the country ever since. But at the level of government, the picture has been very different. After Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz returned to power in 2010, the government became one of the EU’s loudest critics, regularly attacking “Brussels bureaucrats”, liberal values, migration policy and, more recently, EU support for Ukraine. The article explains how Fidesz combined populism, claiming to speak for “ordinary Hungarians” against distant elites, with a kind of Euroscepticism that did not actually want to leave the EU, but rather weaken it from inside while still receiving its funds. It also looks at smaller parties: the far-right Mi Hazánk, which goes further than Fidesz and openly toys with leaving the EU; the now-marginal Jobbik; and the youth-oriented Momentum, which is sometimes confrontational in tone but firmly pro-European. A central part of the story is the gap between governing politicians and ordinary citizens: while the government attacked the EU, most Hungarians kept trusting EU institutions more than their own. This gap helps explain the sudden rise of the Tisza Party in 2024, led by former Fidesz insider Péter Magyar, who broke with the government over a child-abuse pardon scandal and built a centre-right, pro-European alternative. In April 2026, Tisza won a landslide victory, ending sixteen years of Orbán’s rule and signalling that Hungary is heading back toward the European mainstream. The article argues that Hungary’s experience offers important lessons about how populist, anti-EU projects can take root in government and how they can end.