1. Introduction
The present country report was prepared as part of the EUPopLink COST Action (Andreadis & Vasilopoulou, 2026) following the EUPopLink Theoretical Framework and guidelines (Lorimer et al., 2026).
Albania has been an official candidate for European Union (EU) membership since June 2014, but due to insufficient progress on key reforms, accession negotiations formally began in March 2020. The process of EU integration occupies a central place in the country’s political discourse and continues to shape the rhetoric and agendas of political actors across the spectrum. Political elites often frame integration as a national imperative, linking it to broader goals such as democratic consolidation, economic growth, and improved governance. As reported by the latest WeBalkans Perception Survey, public support for EU membership in Albania remains consistently high. Unlike many EU member states where scepticism towards European institutions has grown, Albania continues to exhibit broad pro-European attitudes among its population. However, the slow pace of accession and the repeated postponement of negotiations have generated frustration and as a result the integration process has been highly politicized. In this context, populist rhetoric has emerged not as an ideological commitment but rather as a strategic communication style. In the Albanian case, populism tends to be instrumental. It is employed by mainstream political actors to capitalise on widespread public dissatisfaction, particularly with perceived external injustices or elite failures (Bino et al. 2024). This report identifies the significantly slow advancement of EU accession negotiations as a particularly salient issue around which populist narratives are mobilised. These narratives often portray the EU as an unaccountable and obstructive actor by deflecting blame for the lack of progress and reaffirming the legitimacy of domestic leadership (Kazazi 2024). Although Prime Minister and leader of the ruling Socialist Party Edi Rama, as well as other mainstream political actors consistently affirm EU integration as Albania’s only viable path to development, populist discourses that externalise blame, especially towards the EU, may risk to undermine public trust in European institutions (Bino et al., 2024). Also, the absence of successful outsider challengers, the ideological ambiguity of major parties, and a lack of substantive programmatic differences have positioned populism as the dominant strategy for political mobilization (Bino et al., 2024; Koxha & Heinisch, 2024).
As a result, rather than being the domain of outsider or radical actors, populist discourse in Albania is primarily articulated by dominant parties and leaders, particularly Prime Minister Edi Rama and the governing Socialist Party. As such, populism in Albania should be understood less as a coherent ideology and more as a political and discourse style, employed by actors across the political spectrum to assert closeness to “the people” and antagonism towards perceived elites, both domestic and international.
2. Populist political actors
In contrast to many European countries where populist parties operate on the political margins, in Albania populism is a feature of the mainstream. The country’s two dominant parties, the centre-left Socialist Party (PS) and the centre-right Democratic Party (PD), both exhibit populist communication styles, despite belonging to different ideological profiles. Indeed, both can be categorized as valence populists. Following the 2025 general elections, these two parties remain the principal forces in parliament, alongside new smaller formations with limited political traction. A combination of factors accounts for the fact that these established parties turned to populism as a discourse strategy. First, there is the absence of a successful political outsider that would otherwise have functioned as a real political challenger to the establishment (Koxha and Heinisch 2024). Second, there is the lack of a distinctive ideological profile of the established parties, blurring the differences between them (Koxha and Heinisch 2024). The third factor that favours the rise of populist discourse in Albanian Politics can be attributed to the country’s political culture. In Albania, parties are identified with their respective leaders and emphasizes the role of the latter rather than any ideological or programmatic content (Koxha and Heinisch 2024). The combination of these conditions explains why discursive populism became the most commonly utilized mobilization strategy in party political competition (Koxha and Heinisch 2024).
•
The Socialist Party (PS), led by Prime Minister Edi Rama since 2005, combines a nominally pro-European orientation with an increasingly centralised and personalised style of governance. The party, a successor to the former Party of Labour of Albania, is a centre left oriented party which after the fall of communism rebranded in favour of a modernisation-oriented platform. Nevertheless, it maintains continuity in its tight control over political institutions (Hajdari 2025) and its populist appeals to the will of the people. The PS is an associate of the Party of European Socialists and a member of the Socialist International. Since its foundation, in 1991, the Socialist Party has been led by only two leaders.
The general national elections held in May granted the Socialist Party (PS) a landslide victory by cementing it as Albania’s dominant political force, and securing Prime Minister Edi Rama a historic fourth consecutive term in power, the longest uninterrupted leadership since the 40-year rule of Enver Hoxha and the Communist Party of Labour. The results underscore Rama’s firm grip on the country’s political landscape. Now in his thirteenth year in power, his political dominance leaves the fragmented opposition with little leverage or room for political influence whatsoever (Hajdari 2025).
Prime Minister Rama exemplifies what has been termed a “populist political style.” He positions himself as a charismatic leader and an ‘outsider within’, distancing himself from conventional politics despite his long-standing political career. His public persona, characterised by unconventional attire, colloquial language, and frequent interaction with citizens via social media, emphasises his closeness to ordinary people. Rama’s use of digital media is particularly strategic: through platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, his own podcast “Flasim” and his own personal broadcasting channel ERTV, he bypasses traditional media gatekeepers and speaks directly to citizens, often in emotive and simplified terms. His communications regularly feature storytelling, metaphor, and informal jargon, portraying a leader ‘in touch’ with the common citizen.
Populism in Rama’s rhetoric is marked by anti-elitism, yet this is directed as much at international institutions, such as the EU, as it is at domestic opposition. The discourse around EU integration is illustrative: delays in the accession process are portrayed as injustices imposed by distant elites, thereby strengthening the Prime Minister’s narrative of national victimhood and leadership resilience (Kazazi 2025). At the same time, his centralisation of power, including the growing role of the Council of Ministers and marginalisation of internal party dissent, reflects a wider trend of the personalisation of politics in Albania.
•
The Democratic Party (PD), traditionally defined by its anti-communist orientation, also engages in populist rhetoric, particularly in opposition. The Democratic Party is a centre right party and the largest opposition party in Albania since 2013. Founded in 1990, the PD is an associate member of the European’s People Party and a full member of the International Democracy Union. Its platform was built around anticommunism and its membership includes average citizens as well as anti-communist activists and former political prisoners. Initial commitment to the issue of anticommunism resulted in the signing onto human rights agreements like the Helsinki Accords, a drive towards European modernization. The Democratic Party has always declared itself as pro-European achieving two important milestones like the visa liberalization with the EU and the NATO membership during its time in government. The party frequently frames itself as the defender of ordinary Albanians against a corrupt and autocratic government. The dichotomy of ‘virtuous people’ versus ‘corrupt elite’ is central to its critique of the Socialist government (Bino et al. 2024). However, internal fragmentation caused by the 2021 designation of former Prime Minister and PD founder Sali Berisha as ‘persona non grata’ by the United States has weakened its populist appeal and coherence. The resulting leadership dispute between Berisha and former party leader Lulzim Basha has undermined the party’s ability to present a unified message. During the 2025 general elections the Democrats controversially hired American top campaign strategist Chris LaCivita and Paul Manafort, notably linked to Donald Trump and the MAGA movement. This move was criticized as culturally inappropriate and politically ineffective by both critics at home and abroad who doubted that Albanians would embrace Trumpian rhetoric (Hajdari 2025).
In relation to the two main parties, it is worth to notice that, in both cases, populism operates not as a fringe ideology but as a political technique woven into the practices of the dominant parties. It manifests through appeals to national sovereignty, anti-elitist tropes, personalised leadership, and direct communication with citizens. Importantly, in the Albanian context, populist discourse often targets external actors such as the EU.
•
Smaller political actors - Over the past three decades, several smaller parties, such as the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI), founded by former Prime Minister Ilir Meta and now called the Freedom Party, have attempted to break the duopoly, often acting as kingmakers in coalition governments. Other parties, like the Republican Party or the Social Democratic Party, have occasionally won seats in parliament but failed to build lasting national influence. Despite frequent and public disillusionment with the two main electoral blocs, no third force has won broad support. Normally, political populism requires an outsider party or a group that transformed itself to appear like a political outsider in order to challenge the political establishment as corrupt and engaged in insider politics. Thus, the success of new parties usually depends on their status as ‘challengers’ or ‘outsiders’ as this underscores their credibility (Kelliçi and Bino 2013).
However, the 2025 elections saw the entry of three new parties into parliament, all explicitly positioned against the political establishment. Lëvizja Bashkë or the Together Movement, led by left-wing university professor and activist Arlind Qori evolved from the protest movement Organizata Politike and ran on the slogan “The new is being born”. Shqipëria behet a mixed ideology party led by Adriatik Lapaj employs a strong populist style centred on his image as a successful self-made lawyer offering simple solutions to complex problems. Partia Mundesia,
centre right party, led and financed by former Democratic Party MP and businessmen Agron Shehaj, also displays populist traits. During the electoral campaign Mr. Shehaj declared that what his party aimed is a change of the establishment rather than a rotation of leadership.
3. Positions on ‘Europe’ and the populism–euroscepticism nexus
In Albanian political discourse, ‘Europe’ functions as a powerful symbolic and aspirational reference. As a concept, it evolved from the political discourse that took place after the fall of the socialist regime and came to represent the people’s authentic hopes, especially concerning freedom and democracy, and their aspirations for taking Albania into European countries (Qori 2015). Although political discourse in Albania is formally pro-European, recent years have seen the emergence of a more critical tone in the rhetoric of key political actors, particularly the ruling Socialist Party under Prime Minister Edi Rama. Prior research on the topic suggests that historically The PS made no references to a cultural affinity with Europe, and the theme of European integration is highlighted only from 1996 onwards in terms of institutional integration. PS’s discourse on Europe reached its peak during the 2011 parliamentary elections, during which Albania’s European affiliation was strongly emphasized (Koxha and Heinisch 2024). This discourse remains relevant today. While support for EU accession remains a declared strategic goal across the political spectrum, scepticism towards the EU’s functioning and decision-making processes has become increasingly visible in public discourse. This critique, however, is not a rejection of European integration per se, but rather a form of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, reflecting frustrations with the pace and perceived unfairness of the accession process.
The Prime Minister has taken a leading role in articulating this critical stance. His discourse frequently targets the “bureaucratic” nature of EU institutions and questions the logic behind certain decisions made in Brussels. One particularly contentious issue has been the decision to couple Albania’s accession path with that of North Macedonia, a move perceived by Rama as detrimental to Albania’s progress and symbolic of EU inefficiency. These critiques are primarily rooted in polity-based Euroscepticism: while not rejecting the EU as a project, Rama challenges the institutional logic and political behaviour of the Union, often using emotional and performative rhetoric to highlight perceived injustices.
A notable response to the perceived stagnation of the EU accession process has been the launch of the Open Balkans initiative, also known as the Mini-Schengen. Framed as a regional cooperation platform involving Albania, Serbia, and North Macedonia, the initiative is promoted by the government as a pragmatic step towards regional economic integration. However, its timing and emphasis have led some observers and opposition voices to interpret it as an implicit alternative to EU membership. Critics, particularly from the Democratic Party, argue that since this initiative runs in parallel with the Berlin Process, a platform set up by the EU to increase cooperation between the Balkan Countries, it undermines Albania’s European path and diverts attention from necessary reforms tied to EU accession.
Despite these critiques, Rama’s overall discourse on the EU retains an optimistic undertone. He continues to present EU membership as Albania’s natural and historical destiny and positions the country as a legitimate part of Europe based on its cultural and historical heritage. His speeches often invoke a narrative of civilisation belonging and call for the EU to fulfil its historical mission by integrating the Western Balkans (Kazazi 2024). This balancing act, between critique and affirmation, exemplifies the ambivalence of Albanian Euroscepticism: rhetorical opposition to certain EU decisions is not accompanied by a rejection of the integration project itself.
A clearer populist framing of Euroscepticism emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Albanian government expressed strong dissatisfaction with the EU’s initial response to vaccine distribution. In this context, Rama accused several EU member states of selfishness and cynicism, contrasting their behaviour with Albania’s needs as a small, aspiring member state. This episode further entrenched the Prime Minister’s populist narrative of “us versus them,” portraying the EU as an exclusive elite insensitive to the needs of ordinary people in candidate countries. The rhetorical strategy positioned Albania as both morally superior and unfairly treated, reinforcing domestic legitimacy while deflecting blame for delays in the integration process.
The populist dimensions of these critiques align with a broader pattern in Rama’s communication style: he appeals to national pride, leverages emotional narratives, and situates himself as the authentic voice of the Albanian people against foreign politicians. This is evident in his claim that the EU is not complete without the accession of the Western Balkans and that the EU’s credibility is contingent upon the inclusion of Albania and its neighbours. In such narratives, national interest and European destiny are intertwined—but conditional on the EU living up to its own ideals.
In contrast, the Democratic Party and other opposition parties have often adopted a more consistently pro-European line, taking an adversarial stance towards the government’s Eurosceptic rhetoric. Looking at the political discourse of the PD, we find that Europeanization has been a central theme, especially during the first years after the fall of the old regime (Qori 2015). However, similarly to PS’s rhetoric the PD’s discourse on Europe relies on the identification of the Albanian people with the peoples of Europe, first in terms of adherence to the values of democracy and freedom as the highest goods, and then by referring to Albania’s historical kinship with European civilization.
Overall, in relation to the process of European Integration, their critiques focus on the perceived instrumentalisation of EU discourse by the ruling party and the potential reputational damage caused by attacks on the EU. This divergence highlights the extent to which the EU remains a contested but central axis in Albanian political discourse—both a source of legitimacy and a target of populist frustration.
4. Responses to euroscepticism
Overall, Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government period has coincided with important milestones in Albania’s path toward European Union membership, most notably the formal launch of accession negotiations in July 2022. Also, the European Commission’s progress reports acknowledge several positive reforms, including the streamlining of customs procedures and the adoption of parts of the EU acquis communautaire. However, these reports also highlight ongoing challenges, particularly in prosecuting high-level corruption and money laundering cases, which remain modest in their results (Hajdari 2025). Rama describes this as a “work in progress,” emphasizing gradual improvements, while opposition politicians argue that enforcement continues to be selective and politically motivated.
The notion of Europe and European integration as both a civilizational advantage and an aspirational goal remains a central theme across the political spectrum in Albania. It features prominently in the programs and electoral platforms of the country’s main political parties. Despite this broad pro-European consensus among the public and politicians alike, Albania presents a compelling example of the coexistence between strong support for EU integration and the widespread use of populist discourse by mainstream political actors.
Unlike in many other contexts where populism emerges from outsider movements, in Albania it is embedded within the practices of dominant parties, especially the ruling Socialist Party (PS), and to a lesser extent, the Democratic Party (PD). Populism here does not represent a consistent ideological stance but rather functions as a flexible political style. It is strategically deployed to tap into moments of public discontent, often linked to the perceived slow pace or difficulties in the EU accession process, without fundamentally questioning the goal of European integration itself.
Rama’s political communication exemplifies this dynamic. While officially committed to EU membership, his rhetoric often blends a cautious, polity-based Euroscepticism with appeals to national pride. The EU is frequently portrayed as a distant, bureaucratic institution that fails to adequately recognize Albania’s merits and efforts. This populist tone was especially pronounced during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the EU was framed as an elite club indifferent to the needs of candidate countries. Nonetheless, formal progress toward accession continues under Rama’s leadership.
Opposition parties, notably the PD, maintain a rhetorically pro-European stance but have struggled to offer a distinct alternative to the PS’s populist strategy. Meanwhile, newer political actors, though critical of the establishment, also situate their visions firmly within a European framework.
5. Short conclusion
To conclude, ‘Europe’ remains the central symbol of legitimacy and political aspiration in Albania. The country’s experience highlights how populist communication and European integration can coexist, and even converge, within the same political framework. This alignment invites a broader reflection on its implications for the EU accession process where populist communication does not necessarily translate into Eurosceptic policy positions. In such contexts, populism may serve as a domestic political resource while still accommodating, or even advancing, formal commitments to European integration. Understanding this dynamic becomes essential for assessing how the EU engages with accession states whose internal political styles may appear confrontational, yet whose strategic direction remains firmly oriented toward Europe.
Ethics and consent
Ethical approval and consent were not required.
Data availability
No primary data were collected for this study. The report is based on existing public reports and scholarly literature, all of which are cited in the references list.
References
- Andreadis I, Vasilopoulou S:
The populism-euroscepticism nexus in a contested Europe: The EUPopLink COST Action [version 1; peer review: 3 approved].
Open Res Europe.
2026; 6: 27. PubMed Abstract
| Publisher Full Text
| Free Full Text
- Bieber F:
Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans.
East European Politics.
2018; 34(3): 337–354. Publisher Full Text
- Bieber F, Kmezic M:
EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans in a Time of Uncertainty.
Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG);
2019.
Reference Source
- Bino B, Lula L, Xhaferaj O:
The standstill of the European Integration process and the source of populist discourse in Albania.
Centre Science and Innovation for Development (SCiDEV);
2024.
- Hajdari U:
Is Albania on the Fast Track to One-Party Rule?.
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung;
2025.
- Kelliçi K, Bino B:
Populizmi dhe Komunikimi Politik: Nje Analize Kritike e Ligjerimit Politik te Aleances Kuq e Zi ne Raport me Sistemin e Partive ne Vend.Beshku K, editor.
Politikja: Populli Dhe Populizmi.
Flesh;
2013; pp. 87–104.
- Kazazi L:
The evolution of the Journey Metaphor in Albanian political discourses on European Integration.
Monitor Journal for the Humanities and Social Sciences.
2024; 26(1): 73–84.
- Kazazi L:
European Integration as a Wedding Ceremony – A critical metaphor analysis of Albania-EU relations.Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk B, Trojszczak M, editors.
Cultures, Narratives, and Concepts.
Springer;
2025; Publisher Full Text
- Koxha K, Heinisch R:
In the Political Mainstream: Populism in Albania.Heinisch R, Cekici A, Koxha K, editors.
Perspectives on Populism: Diverse Voices from the European “Periphery”.
Nomos;
2024; 221–247. Publisher Full Text
- Lorimer M, Roch J, van Kessel S :
Populism, euroscepticism, and the populism-euroscepticism nexus [version 1; peer review: awaiting peer review].
Open Res Europe.
2026; 6: 73. Publisher Full Text
- Qori A:
Ideja e Evropes dhe Ideologjia Shqiptare: Studim i Rolit te Idese se Evropes ne Ideologjizimin e Ligjerimit Politik Shqiptar te Pasvitit 1991.
University of Tirana;
2015.
- Vurmo GJ:
Relations of Albania with the EU.
Institute for Democracy and Mediation;
2008.
- WeBalkans.eu:
Annual perception surveys 2025 published.2025, September 2.
Reference Source
