Chega (Enough) party
Founded in 2019 and led by André Ventura, Chega has swiftly become Portugal’s leading PRR party. From electing a single MP in 2019, it expanded to 12 seats in 2022, 50 in 2024, and by 2025 held 60 parliamentary seats (23% of the vote), establishing itself as the second-largest force in the Portuguese parliament. In 2024, it entered the European Parliament with two MEPs.
The analysis of the party’s official documents (Chega, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2022a, 2022b, 2024a, 2024b, 2025) reveals that its ideology rests on three main pillars: populism, nativism, and authoritarianism, commonly associated with the populist radical right (PRR) parties (PRR) (Betz, 2017, 2018; Mudde, 2007, 2017; Rydgren, 2007, 2018).
Chega’s populism manifests in its stark moral dichotomy between a virtuous, homogeneous people and a corrupt elite, typically represented by the long-dominant Socialist (PS) and Social Democratic (PSD) parties. Claiming sole legitimacy to represent the volonté générale and adopting a strongly anti-elitist rhetoric, the party denounces the current regime as morally bankrupt and calls for a new political order (Chega, 2025: 3, 19, 144). Chega’s rhetoric seeks to position the party as the only morally legitimate voice of the ordinary citizen (Marchi, 2023b, 2023a; Marchi & Lisi, 2021; Mendes, 2021; Mendes & Dennison, 2021).
Its nativist agenda supports calls for more restrictive immigration and nationality policies, while accusing national governing elites and European institutions of eroding Portuguese and European heritage through permissive immigration policies (Amado, 2024; Chega, 2025: 54–64; Kelly, 2024; Mendes, 2021; Zúquete & Pimenta, 2024). Additionally, the party’s rhetoric features prominent authoritarian themes, advocating punitive justice, law and order, and a return to traditional values, which the party claims have been undermined by the mainstream political elite (Chega, 2025: 42–53; 64–75).
At the European level, Chega is part of the Patriots for Europe Group, alongside other PRR parties. André Ventura has participated in several international initiatives within this network, including the summit of European radical right leaders held in Madrid in February 2025 under the slogan “Make Europe Great Again”, sharing a platform with Orbán, Le Pen, Salvini, Wilders, and Abascal (Soler, 2025).
Left-wing populist parties in portugal?
Founded in 1921, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) is the oldest party currently in existence in Portugal and one of Western Europe’s most enduring orthodox communist parties. With a long history of opposition to the Estado Novo dictatorship, it remained a relevant parliamentary force throughout much of the post-1974 democratic period. However, its representation has declined markedly in recent years, falling from 13 MPs in 2009 to 6 in 2022, 4 in 2024, and 3 in 2025, the party’s lowest parliamentary representation in the democratic period since 1974. Its representation in the European Parliament has also weakened: after electing two MEPs in 2009, three in 2014, and two in 2019, it returned only one representative in the 2024 European elections.
Officially rooted in Marxist–Leninist principles (Lisi & Freire, 2023), the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) endorses a vanguardist conception of politics, presenting itself as the leading force of the working class. In the case of Marxist–Leninist communist parties more generally, their ideological outlook, typically characterised by the absence of a moral dichotomy between a “pure people” and a “corrupt elite”, has led some authors to argue that they are structurally incompatible with populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: 33; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017: 196). However, in the PCP’s case, it is important to consider not only its official ideology but also its discursive practices, as expressed in electoral manifestos and political programmes. In this regard, earlier research has identified the emergence of certain populist elements in the party’s discourse and political action during the austerity period (2011–2014) (Lisi & Borghetto, 2018).
Across the PCP’s electoral programmes between 2009 and 2025 (CDU, 2022, 2024; PCP, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2019, 2024, 2025a), the party not only affirms itself as the representative of the working class within a capitalist system marked by class struggle, but also, often in parallel, claims to represent the Portuguese people as a unified sovereign entity. This latter formulation aligns with the conceptualisation of populism adopted in this study. Notably, within these programmes, references to the “working class” and the “people” concepts recur in close association, suggesting an overlapping construction of collective political subjects rather than a strict separation between class-based and people-centred appeals.
Consistent with the core features commonly associated with left-wing populism (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015: 4–5; Mudde, 2007: 19), the PCP frames political conflict primarily in terms of socio-economic inequality. It portrays workers and the Portuguese people as subject to exploitation and impoverishment by a national and international financial elite, which is represented as exerting decisive influence over the mainstream parties that have governed Portugal throughout the democratic period, as well as over the European Union itself.
Accordingly, the PCP may be understood as a borderline case of populism within the typological framework adopted here. Although it is not classified as a populist party in the PopuList database, the discursive and rhetorical evidence reviewed above supports, albeit with some caution, its classification as a case of left-wing populism. Moreover, the party has long maintained a hard Eurosceptic stance and has consistently opposed European integration, while remaining affiliated with the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group in the European Parliament.
The Left Bloc (LB), formed in 1999 through the merger of Trotskyist, Maoist, and broader anti-capitalist movements (Lisi & Freire, 2023: 451), is a Radical Left Party (March, 2011: 18). Following its peak of 19 MPs in 2015, it declined to a single seat in 2025. Its representation in the European Parliament similarly decreased, from three MEPs in 2009 to just one in 2024.
Although not classified as a populist party in the PopuList database, academic analyses identify sustained populist traits in LB’s rhetoric (Lisi & Borghetto, 2018; Zúquete, 2022). Consistent with left-wing populism (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015: 4–5; Mudde, 2007: 19), LB frames political conflict around socio-economic inequality, portraying national and international neoliberal elites as responsible for exploiting an economically disadvantaged majority of the people. Across its electoral programmes from 2009 to 2025 (BE, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2019a, 2019b, 2022, 2024a, 2024b, 2025), the LB consistently constructs political conflict through the lens of economic injustice and elite domination, identifying economic, financial (its primary targets), and political elites, both domestic and international, as collectively responsible for the sustained oppression of the people.
Notably, during the period of austerity and the Troika’s intervention in Portugal (2011–2014), the party centred its agenda on opposing the economic adjustment programme imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank. Domestic elites, specifically the PS and PSD parties, were portrayed as complicit and active proponents of this arrangement. The austerity measures were denounced as external domination and oppression imposed upon the Portuguese people (BE, 2011: 2–5; 2014: 3–8).
Although this narrative softened between 2015 and 2019 due to LB parliamentary support for the PS government (BE, 2019b), populist rhetoric re-emerged strongly from 2019 onward. The party portrays “the people” as a politically active subject confronting entrenched elite power, denouncing both Portuguese politics and the European project as captured by private economic interests and dominated by neoliberal and financial elites. This dynamic, it argues, undermines democracy and the welfare state, leading to widespread inequality and the impoverishment of the working population (BE, 2019a: 2–6, 2024b: 6, 2024a: 5–7, 2025: 2–8). LB calls for restoring popular sovereignty at both national and European levels, challenging liberal hegemony and the dominance of economic elites (BE, 2019b: 122–124, 2024a: 14). It advocates public control of strategic sectors in service of the people (BE, 2024b: 116–128), alongside enhanced democratic oversight, referenda, institutional reform, and popular mobilisation (BE, 2022: 204, 212–214, 2024b: 219–220). Thus, the party articulates a consistent left-wing populism, defined by elite critique, redistributive justice, democratic renewal, and the centrality of the people as the legitimate source of authority.
Like the PCP, the LB is part of the GUE/NGL group in the European Parliament. After refusing to join DiEM25 (Guimarães, 2018), LB launched the transnational platform Now, the People in 2018, alongside Podemos (Spain), led by Pablo Iglesias, and La France Insoumise (France), led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Lopes, 2018). This initiative, demonstrating the LB’s proactive role in fostering transnational collaboration within the European radical left, led to the European Left Alliance (ELA) creation in 2024. The alliance promotes a progressive and anti-capitalist vision for Europe and held its first congress in June 2025 in Porto, Portugal (ELA, 2025).
