1. Introduction
The Republic of North Macedonia declared its independence in 1991 and became a candidate for European Union (EU) membership in 2005. Accession negotiations began in 2022, and the screening process was completed in 2023, with the European Commission noting that North Macedonia “has consistently stated its political commitment to the strategic goal of EU integration” (
European Commission, 2024). This strategic orientation is reflected in public opinion, as a majority of citizens express favorable attitudes toward the EU. The most recent nationally representative surveys report strong net positive perceptions: 79%–17% (International Republican Institute, 2024); 67%–19% (National Democratic Institute, 2021); 51%–13% (Regional Cooperation Council, 2024); and 58%–12% (
European Commission, 2025), with the remaining respondents classified as neutral or undecided.
Although support for EU accession remains substantial, it has declined in recent years. A longitudinal public opinion study records a marked drop from 80% in 2014 to 62% in 2024 (Damjanovski, 2025, p. 13). Conversely, opposition to EU integration peaked in 2020, with 22% of respondents expressing negative attitudes, while abstention from a hypothetical referendum on EU membership increased from a negligible 1% in 2014 to a considerable 18% in 2024. The proportion of citizens who consider EU membership highly important also decreased—from 48% in 2014 to 35% in 2024—accompanied by a decline in perceptions of progress toward EU integration (ibid., pp. 14–15). Opposition to EU membership is notably higher among ethnic Macedonians (15%) than among ethnic Albanians (3%), while support is weakest among the youngest and oldest cohorts, with one-third of young respondents indicating they would abstain from an EU referendum (ibid., p. 12).
The decline in support for EU accession in North Macedonia has been driven largely by the country’s prolonged accession process. Greece blocked North Macedonia’s progress toward EU and NATO membership starting in 2008, insisting on a resolution to the name dispute. The issue was formally resolved through the Prespa Agreement (2018), which led to the adoption of the country’s current name, the Republic of North Macedonia, and paved the way for NATO accession in 2020. However, beginning in 2020, Bulgaria initiated withholding its consent for North Macedonia’s EU accession, demanding concessions related to the interpretation of history and language and calling for constitutional amendments to include a Bulgarian minority among the state’s “founding peoples”—a demand that remains unmet. Between the resolution of the dispute with Greece and the onset of tensions with Bulgaria, the EU—partly in response to calls from some member states—adopted a new enlargement methodology (
European Commission, 2020), further delaying progress in North Macedonia’s accession process.
During this protracted EU accession period, North Macedonia experienced a rise in ethno-nationalist narratives and identity-based politics. This trend was particularly emphasized during the decade-long rule (2006–2017) of the center-right Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) (Vangeli, 2011), a period also marked by significant democratic backsliding. This was further amplified by the internal divisions within the EU and its lack of consensus on enlargement, which weakened its credibility among North Macedonia’s citizens and created space for political actors to portray the Union as unreliable. Taken together, these developments have deepened public disillusionment with EU accession and eroded trust in the Union among the country’s citizens (Blanuša et al., 2021).
This report examines the relationship between Euroscepticism and populism in North Macedonia, focusing on the political supply side—that is, political parties and their representatives—in order to capture the current configuration of the party system at the intersection of these two phenomena. The analysis draws on a range of sources, including electoral programs, public statements by party officials, expert surveys on political parties, and public opinion research—some of which are available only in the Macedonian language. The aim is to synthesize existing knowledge on the topic and offer a resource for scholars interested in the nexus between populism and Euroscepticism in the country. The country report was prepared as part of the EUPopLink COST Action (Andreadis & Vasilopoulou, 2026) following the EUPopLink Theoretical Framework and guidelines (Lorimer et al., 2026). Structurally, the report first identifies the main populist actors in North Macedonia, followed by an analysis of how they articulate Euroscepticism, and concludes with an overview of broader political responses to the phenomenon.
2. Populist political actors
Ever since the introduction of multipartyism in the early 1990s, the party system of North Macedonia has been ethnically divided (Šedo, 2010). The major parties mobilize support through clear ethnic branding, reflecting the country’s multiethnic composition: roughly two-thirds of the population identify as ethnic Macedonians, about one-quarter as Albanians, and the rest as Turks, Serbs, Roma, Vlachs, Bosniaks, and others. Political competition is largely characterized by power-sharing along ethnic lines, with each group targeted by corresponding ethnic parties (Fraenkel, 2025; Hulsey & Keil, 2021; Piacentini, 2019). While isolated cases of cross-ethnic voting have occurred, they remain marginal and have not disrupted the prevailing pattern of ethnically segmented electoral behavior. As a result, governments have consistently been formed through coalitions, typically between a major ethnic Macedonian party and an ethnic Albanian partner, often with smaller parties. The present report primarily focuses on political parties that simultaneously exhibit relatively stronger populist and Eurosceptic tendencies, while
Table 1 provides an overview of the major political parties during the 2020–2025 period.
Table 1. Overview of current major political parties in North Macedonia.
| Party acronym and name | Ideology and demographics | Government experience | Populism | Euroscepticism |
|---|
| VMRO-DPMNE
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity | Right-wing, Conservative, Christian-democratic, people’s party of ethnic Macedonians | Extensive as head of government: 1998–2002; 2006–2017; 2024–present. | Pronounced and consistent people-centrism; strategic and occasional anti-elitism and Manichean discourse; populist radical right | Soft |
| LEVICA The Left | Radical left (economic dimension), nativist (cultural dimension), predominantly ethnic Macedonian party | Very limited: 2 MPs: 2020–24; 6 MPs: 2024–present
Local-level presence | Pronounced across all three dimensions (people-centrism, anti-elitism, Manichaeism); left-wing populist with elements of populist radical right | Hard |
| SDSM Social Democratic Union of Macedonia | Center-left, Social-democratic, ethnic Macedonian party with relatively stronger multiculturalist discourse | Extensive as head of government: 1991–1998; 2002–2006; 2017–2024 | Limited to valence populism | None |
| DUI Democratic Union for Integration | Center-left, Ethnic Albanian party | Extensive as junior coalition partner: 2002–2006; 2008–2024 | Limited to valence populism | None |
| AA Alliance for the Albanians | Center-right, Ethnic Albanian party | Limited: government participation post-2017 in various coalitions; local-level presence | Pronounced people-centrism framed in ethnic terms; occasional anti-elitism against political opponents | None |
| Besa Movement | Center-right, Ethnic Albanian party | Limited: government participation post-2017 in various coalitions; local-level presence | Limited to valence populism | None |
| ZNAM For our Macedonia | Center-left
Social-democratic people’s party, ideologically ambiguous, ethnic Macedonian | Limited: central government member since 2024; local-level presence | Pronounced people-centrism framed in ethnic terms; lacks strong anti-elitist or Manichean elements | None |
The political landscape of North Macedonia is rich in populist rhetoric. All political parties employ populism—understood through the ideational approach (see Mudde, 2017)—to varying degrees, often in combination with other strategies of political mobilization such as programmatic politics, clientelism, and charismatic appeal (Bliznakovski et al., 2023). The two parties that hold more pronounced Eurosceptic positions, VMRO-DPMNE and Levica, do not directly support one another, although similar themes occasionally emerge between them, particularly around nativist issues. This report focuses primarily on these two parties, while acknowledging that populist, although not Eurosceptic, elements can also be found—albeit to a much lesser extent—in the rhetoric of other political actors.
VMRO-DPMNE
is a right-wing party endorsing conservative ideology (Lehmann et al., 2024; Norris, 2019). It was established in 1990 as anti-communist, anti-Yugoslav party centered on defending Macedonian identity and culture (Šedo, 2010). In the early 2000s, it adopted a conservative and Christian-democratic profile, while retaining its original ethnocentric appeal and a hardline stance on disputes with Greece and Bulgaria, as well as on interethnic relations. The party governed between 1998–2002, 2006–2017 and is today in power (since 2024), maintaining strong support among more traditionalist and nationalist ethnic Macedonians. Under long-time leader Nikola Gruevski (party president 2002–18 and prime minister 2006–16), the party developed an authoritarian profile (Sotiropoulos, 2023), culminating in the 2015–16 wiretapping scandal that exposed systemic abuse of power and corruption at the top of the party (Priebe, 2015; Auerbach & Kartner, 2022). VMRO-DPMNE is an associate member of the European People’s Party and maintains ties with similar ruling parties in Hungary (Fidesz) and Serbia (SNS)—ties exemplified by Gruevski’s being controversially granted political asylum in Hungary following the disclosure of the wiretapping scandal. Economically, the party leans to the right, promoting pro-business policies, often accompanied by clientelistic practices toward workers, farmers and companies (Cvetičanin et al., 2023). Culturally, it advances a traditionalist agenda, emphasizing national heritage and family values, while opposing multiculturalism and women’s and LGBT+ rights (Miškovska Kajevska, 2018).
VMRO-DPMNE’s discourse relies heavily on populism (Cekikj, 2024, Norris, 2019), which plays a central role in the party’s identity and political communication. This populist rhetoric is primarily characterized by nativism, traditionalism, and ethnocentrism, and secondarily by a form of valence populism that emphasizes the party’s purported superior competence on broadly resonant, non-divisive issues such as economic management, the fight against corruption, and effective governance. The party’s populism is rooted in an exclusive concern for Macedonian national and ethnic interests—a defining feature of its people-centrist outlook and a constant in its public image (Cekikj, 2024, 289–292; Stefoska & Stojanov, 2017). This orientation is often, though not always, accompanied by anti-elitist rhetoric directed at the center-left Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), its main political rival, which VMRO-DPMNE frequently portrays as a corrupt “transition oligarchy” betraying the “people” and “selling out” Macedonian identity (Cekikj, 2024, pp. 288–289). The party’s us-versus-them discourse—used to stress its closeness to ordinary citizens in contrast to “self-interested elites”—intensified during the wiretapping scandal (Gjuzelov & Ivanovska Hadzievska, 2019, pp. 11–13), when then-leader Nikola Gruevski advanced a narrative portraying ethnic Macedonians as victims of collusion between domestic and international elites allegedly conspiring to undermine the state.1
Levica was established during the period of the wiretapping scandal by a group of left-wing activists with a clear far-left political platform. After failing to enter parliament in its first electoral contest in 2016, the party underwent personnel changes and adopted a strong nativist discourse. This event led it to secure nearly 7% of the popular vote (and 6 out of 120 MP positions) in the 2024 parliamentary elections, positioning Levica as a rising political force in the country. The party’s program is centered on redistribution and expansion of the welfare state, with left-wing socio-economic appeals (Levica, 2020, 2024). However, the party’s rhetoric is simultaneously right-wing in the cultural dimension (Bosilkov, 2021), centered on the defense of Macedonian national interests. Levica strongly opposes the Prespa Agreement with Greece, NATO membership and concessions in internal ethnic relations, while advocating closer ties with Russia, accession to alternative international alliances such as the Eurasian Economic Union, and the reorientation of the country’s foreign policy away from the West (Rechica, 2023). Among all parliamentary parties, Levica is notable for the more extreme tone of its rhetoric, with its leader and MP, Dimitar Apasiev, known for an outspoken, unapologetic and often controversial style (Bosilkov, 2021).
Levica’s populism is marked by a strong anti-imperialist and anti-establishment stance directed at the long-term ruling parties, the business elite, the professional NGO sector, and international actors such as NATO and the EU (ibid., pp. 49–52). The party targets mainstream actors across both the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian blocs, portraying them as part of a corrupt political and economic elite. It also opposes Albanian nationalism while accusing Macedonian parties of “selling out” national identity. In parallel, Levica promotes a strong people-centric narrative on both socio-economic and nativist issues as well as a notable Manichean discourse, with party officials portraying a broad array of actors as the “establishment” that “must be removed” for the people to reclaim control over their future. Levica thus draws on populist themes that resonate across ideological extremes, appealing to both far-right and far-left segments of the electorate. It can therefore be classified as a left-wing populist party, while also incorporating elements typically associated with the populist radical right.
3. Positions on ‘Europe’ and the populism-Euroscepticism nexus
Apart from Levica, all major parties in North Macedonia maintain a long-standing declarative pro-European stance. Nevertheless, even with its official pro-EU stance, VMRO-DPMNE can be seen as exhibiting a form of soft and equivocal Euroscepticism, lacking a consistently articulated stance (Gjoneska et al., 2020), while Levica represents a case of hard Euroscepticism. In the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) on EU candidate countries (Bakker et al., 2019), VMRO-DPMNE and Levica received scores of 5.2 and 4.3, respectively, on the overall orientation of party leadership towards EU integration (where 1 indicates “strongly opposed” and 7 “strongly in favor”). All other parties received scores of at least 6.5. Both parties, VMRO-DMNE and Levica were also rated as assigning lower relative salience to EU integration—5.7 for VMRO-DPMNE and 4.0 for Levica—compared to the lowest score of 7.7 among the remaining parties (on a 0–10 scale, where 0 indicates “European integration is of no importance” and 10 “European integration is of great importance”).
Thus, Levica stands out as the primary Eurosceptic force in the country (Bakker et al., 2019), openly opposing the fulfillment of economic and political requirements for EU membership. In the 2019 CHES survey, this political party received scores of only 2.3 (economic requirements) and 3.0 (political requirements) on 1–7 scales measuring parties’ support for fulfilling the EU accession criteria (where 1 indicates “strongly opposed to fulfilling” and 7 “strongly in favor of fulfilling”). In particular, the party questions EU membership if it is conditioned on national identity concessions, and calls for alignment with alternative political and economic blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (see the pre-election programs of Levica, 2020, 2024). Levica often frames EU integration as an extension of Western imperialist ambitions, portrayed as harmful to socio-economic conditions, local culture, and national sovereignty.2 The EU is further accused of supporting “foreign” elements—e.g., the Albanians, Greece, and Bulgaria—that allegedly threaten the Macedonian state. The party advocates closer ties with Russia, supports Russia’s war in Ukraine, and routinely portrays NGOs and independent media as “mercenaries” of the “West”.
VMRO-DPMNE, on the other hand, exhibits a more covert form of Euroscepticism. The party’s overall stance has been characterized by experts as “somewhat in favor” of EU membership, with relatively little internal dissent on the question of European integration (Bakker et al., 2019). While VMRO-DPMNE does not oppose the EU in principle, it frequently expresses skepticism about the Union’s practices, integrity, and long-term prospects. This position is often rooted in criticism of the EU’s role in issues related to Macedonian national identity.3 Although the party primarily advances soft Euroscepticism, its intensity fluctuates depending on the political context. It reached a peak during former Prime Minister Gruevski’s response to the wiretapping scandal, when the EU—and the West more broadly—were depicted as negative external influences (Blanuša et al., 2021; Gjoneska et al., 2020; Gjuzelov & Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2019). Similar rhetoric reappeared during moments when ethnic Macedonians were perceived to be making concessions in interethnic relations or in negotiations with neighboring states (Brunnbauer, 2002).4 Eurosceptic discourse thus tends to gain prominence among VMRO-DPMNE officials during such polarized episodes and remains a persistent feature of the party’s political communication.
In sum, Euroscepticism in political discourse in North Macedonia is largely tied to a nativist populist appeal, emphasizing the concessions that EU integration is perceived to demand from ethnic Macedonians. This discourse is most clearly articulated by the long-standing mainstream party VMRO-DPMNE, as well as by the smaller political party Levica, which also advances Euroscepticism from a left-wing populist perspective. Eurosceptic arguments are typically embedded within broader populist narratives: people-centrism (with “the people” understood as ethnic Macedonians, particularly in relation to interethnic dominance and identity expression); anti-elitism (portraying the EU as an external agent aligned with forces that undermine the Macedonian state and identity); and a Manichean worldview in which ethnic Macedonians must “reclaim” their rightful status by confronting a hostile elite. As discussed in Section 2, these parties differ significantly in their populist profiles—exhibiting all or only some of these elements to varying degrees—and accordingly mobilize Euroscepticism in varying ways.
4. Responses to Euroscepticism and consequences
Levica’s outright rejection of the EU is opposed by all major parties.5 On the other hand, VMRO-DPMNE—despite being declaratively “pro-European”—is occasionally accused by its competitors of lacking sincerity in its commitment to EU integration.6 All parties engage in mutual blame over North Macedonia’s prolonged and delayed EU accession process, contributing to an adversarial dynamic within the party system on this issue. For instance, SDSM has sought to differentiate itself by highlighting its role in advancing EU integration, particularly in comparison to VMRO-DPMNE’s slower or more ambivalent progress.7 In striking agreements with Greece and managing relations with Bulgaria, SDSM has also attempted to ease nativist sentiments by framing EU accession as a high-stakes trade-off that justifies concessions.
Overall, hard Euroscepticism in North Macedonia is broadly dismissed, yet Eurosceptic attitudes have gained traction, particularly when rooted in nativist sentiments and linked to perceptions of the EU’s role in matters central to Macedonian identity, culture, and political sovereignty. Opposition to hard Euroscepticism comes not only from all mainstream political parties but also from segments of civil society and the media. Nevertheless, despite the marginalization of outright Euroscepticism, Eurosceptic narratives remain present in political discourse. Notably, the country’s most pronounced Eurosceptic actor—Levica—is currently represented in parliament and has become the largest explicitly Eurosceptic party in North Macedonia’s parliamentary history. Meanwhile the major political force and current ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE, routinely engages in soft Eurosceptic rhetoric in response to specific developments. The two main Eurosceptic actors do not coordinate or align on this front, and their variants of Euroscepticism differ significantly in both form and ideological grounding.
5. Conclusion
This report has examined the relationship between Euroscepticism and populism in North Macedonia, focusing on the political supply side. It analyzed the positions of two major political parties that display elements of Euroscepticism—VMRO-DPMNE and Levica—and explored how their Eurosceptic narratives intersect with their populist appeals. Given that ethnic-based politics remain a defining feature of North Macedonia’s political landscape—both in domestic and external affairs, where the EU often plays a moderating role in contrast to domestic “hardliners”—our analysis suggests that both parties rely heavily on nativist sentiments, positioning themselves as protectors of ethnic Macedonian identity. The smaller of the two, Levica, additionally combines these narratives with left-wing Eurosceptic arguments. None of the remaining parties in the system exhibit explicit Euroscepticism, although all, to varying degrees, employ populist rhetoric—a broader overview of which is provided in the
Table 1.
Taken overall, North Macedonia is not a context in which Eurosceptic appeals are highly prevalent, yet such rhetoric has gained traction, particularly in connection with concessions perceived by ethnic Macedonians along the country’s EU accession path. The intersection of populism and Euroscepticism thus centers on the discourse of defending ethnic Macedonian interests, resonating most strongly with parties on the right of the political spectrum. Should North Macedonia’s accession process face further delays, there is reason to anticipate a potential intensification of Eurosceptic sentiment, likely framed through ethnocentric and populist appeals.
Ethics and consent
Ethical approval and consent were not required for this study, as it is based entirely on publicly available secondary sources and does not involve primary data collection or human subjects research.
Data availability
No primary data are associated with this article. This country report draws on publicly available secondary sources, all of which are cited in the text and listed in the references.
Acknowledgements
ChatGPT (OpenAI) was used by one of the authors (J. Bliznakovski) for language editing assistance during the preparation of this manuscript. Final language editing was performed by a co-author (M. Bekar).
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