The media discourses: ‘tourismphobia’, politics, branding and the right to protest
Through the analysis of these media texts (news articles, op eds, editorials, letters from readers), several discourses were identified, which are explained in the following subsections. It is important to clarify that these narratives do not appear as isolated themes and in practice are extremely intertwined.
Tourismphobia and overtourism. At first glance, ‘tourismphobia’ seems to have a singular meaning in these media texts: the local discontent associated to the massive presence of tourists. There are two significant aspects that must be addressed in relation to this concept: first, the newspapers and journalists seem to use this term interchangeably to represent both the ‘protests’ or demonstrations and the ‘sentiment’ that is growing within the ‘affected’ communities. Second, ‘tourismphobia’ is conceptually linked to mass tourism, to a certain idea of overcrowding (similar to the idea of ‘overtourism’). However, these are both partial interpretations of the phenomenon.
By equating tourismphobia to acts of dissent, the media narratives lose track of the diversity of protest strategies and ‘ideological’ positions among those who are critical of the global tourism industry. For example, the discussions about the causes of ‘overtourism’, the strategies to communicate the impact of these ‘externalities’ to the public or the potential solutions are oftentimes long and marked by disagreements within the same ‘antagonist group’. While there is not enough evidence to suggest that these media narratives comply with the ‘protest paradigm’ mentioned above, there are some paragraphs and quotations from powerful sources that clearly stigmatize protest acts and overemphasize the spectacular nature of these demonstrations. Particularly when referring the acts of dissent organized by Arran, several media reported the ‘loud and violent’ music accompanying the videos, the presence of ‘disguised’ protesters and the ‘angry’ attitude of the participants. The texts repeatedly described the ‘vandalism’ of these protest acts, by emphasizing the clash with local authorities and the police (mostly in the form of official reports and public condemnation from legitimate sources such as local/national politicians).
The usage of ‘tourismphobia’ as an equivalent for mass tourism and overcrowding likewise denotes a biased view of the problem. Although both play a role on aggravating some of the negative consequences of the global tourism industry, there are serious externalities that could not be solved by simply ‘reducing’ tourist numbers. In the case of ‘disruptive’ behaviors of tourists, the ‘few’ that engage in binge drinking or public sex easily overshadow the ‘majority’ of law-abiding, respectful tourists (especially during the ‘low season’ when less visitors are the norm)9. Similarly, the overall decrease of affordable housing due to the transformation of these units into tourist rentals might be the result of the expectation of potential visitors, impacting the lives of locals significatively throughout the entire year, whether tourists are presently visiting the area or not.
The political uses of ‘tourismphobia’ have been noticed by several scholars who have questioned its validity within analytical settings (Alcalde García et al., 2018; Huete & Mantecón, 2018; Milano et al., 2019; Zanardi, 2019). Even if ‘tourismphobia’ is a buzzword used by local politicians and journalists to ‘stigmatize’ protest acts, its meaning has not been uncontested: a reader (Torres, 2017) characterized derelict places in need of public investment as a form of ‘tourismphobia’, and the term was mentioned in the headline of a news article criticizing the management of the Spanish government regarding the security staff strike at El Prat Airport in 2017 (Diario Crítico, 2017a). Social movements, including the Association of Neighborhoods for Tourism Degrowth (formerly, Association of Neighborhoods for Sustainable Tourism) and the Arran group itself, have emphatically argued against the term ‘tourismphobia’, explaining that the target of their activism is the economic model that makes cities dependent on mass tourism and it does not imply a ‘phobia’ against visitors. This statement was often mentioned in the press.
Another political use of the concept was identified in relation to the hotel industry stakeholders, which often attributed the increasing ‘tourismphobia’ to the emergence of tourist rentals. This narrative functions as a strategy by the hotel businesses to separate themselves from the criticism directed toward the tourism industry, while attempting to sympathize with locals in their struggle against platforms such as Airbnb. It could be argued that the hotel industry stakeholders would benefit from any regulation imposed on Airbnb and similar digital platforms, and consequently it is ‘lucrative’ for them to frame tourist rentals as the main cause of ‘anti-tourism’ sentiments.
The public debate that took place in the summer of 2017 was a combination of several other ‘phobias’: in some news articles, ‘tourismphobia’ was paired with xenophobia, most noticeable in a declaration made by Jaume Collboni (Benvenuty, 2017), a representative of the local government in an effort to censor ‘anti-tourism’ sentiments. Other political figures such as Carina Mejías (Ciutadans) reportedly denounced the ‘criminalization of tourism’ (Sust, 2017a). The term guirifobia appeared in a couple of texts as an equivalent to ‘tourismphobia’ (Serna Andrés, 2017), although guiri is a pejorative slur generally used to refer to (wealthy) foreigners. Other phobias included the taxphobia (tasafobia in Spanish), pointing out the resistance that local stakeholders in the tourism industry (particularly the hotel sector) show in relation to any taxes (F.D.G. 2017). An article by Pau Morata (2017) speaks of excursionphobia (excursionofòbia), or the local discontent with day trippers whose contribution to the city is deemed ‘insufficient’, which was perceived by the author as a potential threat to ‘freedom of movement’. An article in El Mundo refers to neighborphobia (vecinofobia), describing how the existing management of tourism impacts the lives of local populations (Oms, 2017). Roger Pallarols, from the association of restaurateurs, used the term ‘institutional terracephobia’ (terrazofobia institutional) in reference to the ‘excessive’ regulations and monitoring of the terraces (Sust, 2017b)10. Finally, the group Arran itself declared that their actions were not tourismphobia, but a fight against the ‘barricidio’ (murdering of a neighborhood) (Blanchar & Baquero, 2017). The concept of barriofilia also appears as a potential substitute to the narrative of ‘tourismphobia’.
The activism of Arran, which could be considered here as a form of ‘radical’ politics, was discursively associated to the notion of ‘kale borroka’, a series of political and violent acts that constitute a form of urban guerrilla linked to the nationalist Basque movement (Ramos, 2017). A few public figures such as Odón Elorza (a former mayor of San Sebastián) censured this comparison, even if he reportedly opposed the ‘attacks’ against tourism orchestrated by Arran (Europapress, 2017). The ‘kale borroka’ narrative discursively linked the actions of Arran to the national struggles against domestic separatist terrorism (particularly in reference to ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna). Pablo Echenique (from the political party Podemos) was quoted in an article denouncing the comparison between these protest acts and ETA (Huffington Post – Spain 2017). The ‘kale borroka’ narrative was also applied against the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and its People’s Party (PP), in a statement by Alfred Bosch (ERC – Republican Left of Catalonia), who characterized them ‘kale borroka with a tie’ in reference to the aforementioned strike crisis at El Prat Airport (Vázquez, 2017).
Local politics. The public debate on ‘tourismphobia’, overtourism and the acts of dissent was a ‘power struggle’ in which several local parties and tourism stakeholders expressed agreement/disagreement with each other, both concerning the management of tourism in Barcelona (or in other affected cities) and the ‘official’ response to the ‘radical’ politics employed by Arran. In this regard, the CUP was blamed for the actions of Arran, and the criticism included references to their ‘refusal to censor the violent attacks’ as well as to the political bargaining that the party was exerting apropos the upcoming 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum.
The complexity of this dimension of the debate between competing political parties will not be examined here, but it is important to mention that the criticism was predominantly directed against the Mayor of Barcelona Ada Colau and her team (explicitly, Agustí Colom, head of the Tourism Department). In short, Mayor Colau was blamed for exacerbating ‘tourismphobia’ (even during her candidacy campaign) and she was accused of being vague in her condemnation of the ‘violent’ acts of Arran (Blanchar & Baquero, 2017). The disapproval was also extended to other prior decisions taken by the local government to ‘manage’ tourism, particularly the moratorium against new hotel developments.
This political debate included all sort ‘legitimate’ sources, from those demanding severe punishment against the members of Arran to those relativizing the protest acts. Agustí Colom, for example, pointed out that the actions of Arran ‘do not contribute to the tourism debate’ (Sust, 2017a), which could be now considered an erroneous statement given the subsequent national/European public debate ensuing from Arran’s ‘radical’ and ‘spectacular’ politics. Economist Miquel Piug (2017), on the contrary, warned against considering these actions as ‘irrational’, arguing that the myth of prosperity surrounding tourism (often associated to economic growth and job creation) needs to be revisited. Mireia Boya, as representative of the CUP party, asked to focus on the violent nature of the ‘economic model’ motivating the protests11, considering the events ‘symbolic acts’ (Ramos, 2017). Against this type of statement, journalist Alicia Huerta (2017) emphasized the vandalism of the protests, questioning the idea of reading these acts as symbolic but also acknowledging that ‘confetti does not hurt’. Although there are numerous opinions and ‘ideological’ positions about the ‘radical’ acts coordinated by Arran, a common statement is that even if these protests are somehow justified, the manner of these acts of dissent was inappropriate and therefore Arran’s actions must be condemned.
National politics. Among the many opinions against Arran, the declarations attributed to Spanish Prime Minister Manuel Rajoy in various media texts are a clear example of the ‘classic’ protest paradigm. Former Prime Minister Rajoy characterized the protesters as ‘extremists’ going against common sense, with clear political agendas (a reference to the Catalan independentism). Prime Minister Rajoy’s statement emphasized the importance of tourism for both GDP (11%) and employment (2.5 million jobs). The ‘where’ and ‘when’ of this declaration seems to be particularly significant. As reported by El País (Vizoso, 2017), this declaration took place during the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the hotel chain Hotusa, which reportedly belongs to Rajoy’s childhood friend Amancio López Seijas. Indeed, López Seijas shared his opinion about the ‘anti-tourism’ protests in the same article by El País, highlighting both the tolerance and complicity of some local governments (implicitly, this could refer to Mayor Ada Colau) with those who protest against tourism. The businessman additionally pointed out the importance of the labor reform approved by Prime Minister Rajoy, saying that this allowed his company to ‘create positions’ at a ‘reasonable cost’12.
The Minister of Tourism Álvaro Nadal was likewise quoted in media texts demanding ‘forcefulness’ (contundencia) in both the investigation and sanction of these protest acts. In an interview with El Periódico de Catalunya (Grau, 2017), Nadal explicitly rejects the term ‘tourismphobia’, indicating that he prefers to denote these acts as ‘vandalism’ instead of reading them as ‘protests’. Furthermore, Nadal explains that the issues around tourism are a matter of ‘saturation’ of key services and that regulation and management could help to improve the overall situation of local inhabitants. This statement is incompatible with the position of local groups that actively campaign for tourism degrowth13 and with the requests made by Arran in their online statement (i.e., expropriation of tourist assets, ban of tourist rentals, increased taxes for tourism-related businesses and the improving of working conditions for the workforce in the sector).
Branding. Concerns about the damages to the ‘city-brand’ caused by ‘tourismphobia’ are often mentioned among the many sources in the news articles, varying from local politicians to tourism stakeholders (again the hotel sector or tourism associations such as Exceltur, but also big consortia such as TUI Group). The debate about this branding goes beyond tourism, and various articles have direct references to the candidacy of Barcelona as the host of the European Medicines Agency, which needed to relocate after the Brexit vote (and was later won by Amsterdam, another city experiencing increasing disaffection with global mass tourism). This example shows that branding is not exclusively created for tourism purposes but also for attracting foreign investment, governmental headquarters or high-tech industries.
In specific, the ‘radical’ protests are perceived as a ‘threat’ to a series of brands, including a) The Barcelona brand, as European capital (or Mallorca brand, etc.); b) the Catalunya brand, as cultural region; c) the Spain brand, as ‘sun and beach’ country; and finally, d) the Europe brand, as global tourism destination. These brands are intertwined and co-dependent, and while the works of Gaudí might be more associated to the Barcelona brand, other references such as the relative security of the country (i.e. when compared to Turkey and Egypt) are part of the Spain brand. Additional features such as a ‘welcoming nature’ are more ambiguous and seem to apply to the whole set of brands. After the events organized by Arran, the main ‘fear’ was that tourists would read the protests as an ‘attack’ against them and would logically choose another destination, while jeopardizing years of (public) investment in building each specific brand. Maria Salom, delegate of the Spanish Government in the Balearic Islands, was quoted in the Mail Online (Sobot, 2017) saying: “[a] number of irresponsible people cannot damage our image and disturb tourists who visit us.”, a clear statement that decodes protest acts (and especially ‘radical’ protests like those by Arran) as a threat to the carefully advertised ‘image’ of Spain (or Mallorca) and as an inconvenience for paying visitors.
Press in the United Kingdom and Germany. International media addressed the local discontent regarding the global tourism industry in Barcelona and other Spanish cities, and referring to the term ‘tourismphobia’, there was a sort of epidemiological narrative that expressed the fear of the ‘anti-tourism’ protests spreading to other destinations (both at the national level to cities like Madrid and beyond borders to France and Portugal). British press, for example, included a discussion on the value of British tourism for Spain, and while some articles provided information about the ‘reasons’ behind the local discontent (i.e. holiday rentals, overcrowding, ‘unruly’ behavior of Brits abroad), the texts explicitly referred to the economic income generated by British tourists, and at least one article invited Spain to imagine what would happen if British visitors took their money to other destinations (Gavin, 2017). ‘Tourismphobia’ was also interpreted as a sort of ‘payback’ for the outcome of the Brexit referendum, but this narrative was rare. In German press, there was a relevant discussion about of the results of a poll made to Germans nationals, who expressed embarrassment for the behavior of fellow Germans abroad while conveying understanding of the motives of those who were protesting against mass tourism in Barcelona and other Spanish cities. Considering these local news in United Kingdom and Germany, it could be argued that the ‘anti-tourism’ protests in Barcelona effectively communicated the message in Spain’s two main visitor markets, informing these potential ‘tourists’ about the needs and concerns of local inhabitants and the several negative impacts of their holidays.
Statements in defense of tourism. Most of the arguments in defense of tourism underlined both the economic value in terms of the GDP and its role in job creation. Other ‘positive characteristics’ of tourism, such as the fostering of understanding between different cultures, its contribution to the protection of heritage or its role in education were rarely emphasized in the articles. In short, tourism was generally valued as a global industry, which is a trend that has been previously identified by Higgins-Desbiolles (2006), who argues that this discourse benefits the needs and agendas of tourism stakeholders and local/national governments. Indeed, local and national politicians in the analyzed media texts consistently addressed the need to protect tourism and visitors, although some sources recognized the urgency to find solutions to the many ensuing ‘externalities’ associated to the industry. The solutions included for the Barcelona case, that are similar to those proposed for Venice and Amsterdam, focused on various strategies: targeting ‘luxury’ tourism sectors, tracking tourists with digital technologies, heavy fines for ‘unruly’ behaviors, tourist caps and increased taxes, or the geographical relocation of tourists by creating ‘new tourists attractions’. These solutions are reduced to issues of management and are ‘reformist’ in nature, and in open antagonism with the demands of tourism degrowth made by local groups such as the Association of Neighborhoods for Tourism Degrowth (ABDT) or Arran.
In some articles, journalists included the point of view of tourists concerning their ‘opinions’ or their ‘knowledge’ about ‘anti-tourism’ protests and ‘tourismphobia’. A common argument is that tourists were not aware of any protest against visitors, or they did not understand why locals were unhappy with their presence, arguing that they economically contribute to the city during their stay. As mentioned above apropos the protest paradigm, the quoting of these visitors might work as ‘bystanders’ portrayals that contribute to the delegitimization of the protests, while re-emphasizing the ‘official’ discourse that tourism revenue ‘justifies’ any inconveniences caused by the industry.
A more explicit defense of tourism was observed in petitions endorsed by local stakeholders (i.e., hotel industry stakeholders, tour guides, tourism agencies, etc.), in which these powerful businesses demanded action by the government (both at local and national level) to protect the (perceived) ‘threatened’ industry. Even before the series of ‘attacks’ coordinated by Arran, several members of the hotel sector denounced ‘attacks’ against their establishments (and the total number of events varied according to each media outlet, ranging from two as reported in El Imparcial to twelve as reported in ABC)14. These powerful business groups advocated for tourism publicly through the media and through lobbying, arguing that the protection of tourism was a sort of ‘common good’ (i.e., ‘we are all tourism’ as expressed by an Exceltur slogan)15.
Finally, an article published by El Mundo described the ‘attack’ against the sightseeing bus from the perspective of the Ecuadorian driver, who is quoted saying he only ‘wants to secure an income’ (ganarse la vida). The driver also denies the knife story mentioned by other media, indicating that the protesters used an awl. The article includes a list of other ‘violent’ protests orchestrated by Arran, both in the context of mass tourism and Catalan independentism (Iglesias & Mucha, 2017). Other workers in the media texts specifically referred to the protest acts by Arran, including the manager of a restaurant in La Barceloneta named Ana Paula Lourenço, who pointed out that “scaring people, making them feel unwelcomed (non grata) is not defending Barcelona, it is damaging Barcelona” (França, 2017).
Terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, which took place on the afternoon of August 17th, changed the debate about the protest acts. Some articles pointed out the support that both local business and citizens of Barcelona provided to fleeing tourists, characterizing the city as open and welcoming (Marchena, 2017). Similarly, political acts condemning these terror acts were interpreted as a ‘pause’ in local conflicts, both in regard to ‘tourismphobia’ and the upcoming Catalan Independence referendum. Considering that the attacks happened in one of the most visited spots in the city, the media narratives changed from ‘overcrowding’ of Las Ramblas to the international value of the street (Cabeza, 2017). The terror act was also perceived as an attack to Western societies, comparing Barcelona to other cities affected by international terrorism (yihadismo), specifically Paris, London and Berlin (Ayora, 2017).
A related debate focused on the impact that these terror acts could have in both the branding of Barcelona and the flow of visitors, with sources such as Minister of Tourism Álvaro Nadal pointing out that these events would not damage the reputation of the city as ‘safe destination’ (Grau, 2017). A similar statement was made by Rafael Gallego from the Spanish Confederation of Travel Agencies (CEAV) in the Spanish website Expansión, who pointed out that these acts are a shared ‘risk’ for many European cities, and that these events would not ‘affect the image of Barcelona, Spain or Europe’ (Arroyo, 2017). Although there are some references to a reported increase in cancellations following the terrorist attacks, experts expressed confidence in the projected growth of tourism numbers, predicting a record year (which it indeed was with circa 82 million tourists).
It is important to highlight that, while international terrorism was considered a sort of ‘single event’ that will not cause significantly impact to the Barcelona brand, the protest acts organized by local citizenship were considered a ‘threat’ to the image and future of the city. This could be read as both delegitimization and demonization of the right to protest, considering that in the long history of dissent against mass tourism in Barcelona, the protest acts have generally been peaceful in nature.
The 2017 Catalan independence referendum. The upcoming referendum on the independence of Catalunya (and the ‘illegality’ of this consultation) was discussed since the early days of the Arran protests, particularly because the group has repeatedly campaigned for the autonomy of the region. After the terror acts that took place in August 2017, the referendum took a more prominent role, allegedly associated with an exodus of several international businesses from Barcelona and the relocation of some cruise ships. With the fear of increased protests of those in favor of independentism, both before and after the referendum, tourism numbers were low and the media narratives discussed this scenario extensively. Although tourism numbers in 2017 were at a record high, several stakeholders of the tourism industry continuously expressed concern about the long-term implications of the political upheaval in the future of the industry, associating the referendum with ‘tourismphobia’.
The right to protest. The main discussion identified in the media texts, both across diverse outlets and throughout the years, was centered on the ‘correct’ ways to protest. The debate questioned the legitimacy of engaging in ‘radical’ politics, which are perceived as ‘vandalism’ and ‘violence’. Although the benefits of mass tourism are frequently mentioned (i.e. employment and economic growth), there is – at various degrees – a recognition that tourism is not harmless, and that it indeed creates a series of grave issues that negatively impact the quality of life of local populations and the environment. The discussion concerning the solutions to these ‘externalities’ tend to focus on technological and management strategies, while discarding other possibilities more in tune with the demands of local activists, such as tourism degrowth.
Although there is not a categorical condemnation of protests or an explicit denial of the right to protest, there is clear evidence of stigmatization, delegitimization and demonization of protesters and their acts of dissent. Various journalists emphasize the circus/carnival atmosphere of the protest acts organized by Arran. The violence of the acts was repeatedly discussed, and this drama does not exclusively refer to ‘the facts’ (which varied from one newspaper to another), but also included hypothetical situations. There is a common ‘what if’ narrative associated to the ‘attack’ against the sightseeing bus in Barcelona, which included statements such as: what if police officers were there? What if there were (violent) hooligans on the bus? What if a tourist defends himself? These potential scenarios contributed to add more drama and spectacle to the ‘news’ article, while further demonizing protesters and their acts of dissent.
As mentioned above, protesters were repeatedly labelled ‘vandals’, ‘aggressive’, ‘angry’ and ‘ignorant’. Several news articles quoted a politician from the People’s Party (PP), Fernando Martínez-Maillo referring to the members of Arran as ‘brainless and insolent kids’ (niñatos descerebrados y malcriados), a clear infantilization of protesters (Diario Crítico, 2017b). Similarly, a declaration by former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy referred to protesters as ‘extremists’ (Vizoso, 2017). While the ‘radical’ politics employed by Arran might justify this depiction for some readers/citizens, the main issue here is that the diversity of social movements and collectives included in the term ‘protesters’ and ‘tourismphobia’ is stigmatized as a whole.
2018 and beyond16. In 2018, Arran continued its activism against mass tourism, and it made the headlines again due to the ‘radical’ politics employed in their protests, with more actions in Palma de Mallorca and Barcelona. In June 2018, the group occupied the famous ‘dragon’ at Park Güell, using chains to tie themselves to the sculpture, as reported by El País (Andrés, 2018), while again using red flares and banners against mass tourism. For this specific protest, their Twitter account included the hashtag #capitalismofòbia (capitalismphobia), which an explicit rejection of the term ‘tourismphobia’. The selection of Park Güell, a space that has been contested between locals and tourists more than a decade17, was evidently a strategy to capture media attention.
Their subsequent acts were still communicated through their Twitter accounts, including a protest near the Olympic village in Barcelona (targeting another sightseeing bus) and another at the airport in Palma (in coordination with the group Ciutat per a qui l'habita). In 2019, the group protested again against rental cars in Palma de Mallorca, posting a video on their YouTube channel, this time musicalized with ‘less violent’ music, namely the song “In the summertime” by Mungo Jerry. These ‘attacks’ were reported in local and international (British) media and were equally condemned by local authorities and tourism stakeholders.
In 2019, Arran Palma tweeted that the members of their organization were facing between 2 and 4 years of prison for their protest at the port of Palma in 2017, for a total of 26 years for the 12 participants. This was perceived as ‘repression’ by the group, and equally condemned by other left-wing organizations such as Alerta Solidària.
In 2020, after the coronavirus pandemic forced the cancellation of the majority of flights and cruises, and left Barcelona and Palma de Mallorca reasonably emptied of tourists, Arran continued its online activism publishing a statement on their own website, highlighting once again the dangers of the dependency on the global mass tourism industry, which in the context of the pandemic meant added health risks, precarious work and lack of access to affordable housing.
An interview with a spokesperson from Arran
Before concluding this paper, this section offers some additional information resulting from a short interview that took place with a spokesperson from Arran in Barcelona in early January 202018. The interview was semi-structured, and the main goal was to contrast the information published by both local and international media. When asked about the “three main negative side effects” associated to mass tourism in Barcelona, the spokesperson from Arran identified ‘four’: a) gentrification and lack of access to affordable housing, which causes the expulsion of local inhabitants; b) the environmental impact of tourism, particularly in relation to cruise tourism; c) overcrowding and appropriation of public spaces, creating a sort of ‘theme parks’; and finally d) the economic model created by the industry, based on precarious work and exploitation. The answers were similar to the ones given by other ‘less radical’ activists, and instead of fitting the media characterization of the members of Arran as ‘childish’ or ‘ignorant,’19 the spokesperson from Arran offered a ‘fact-based’ explanation (and one which could be supported by former studies on the impacts of mass tourism in Barcelona). For example, the environmental impact of cruise tourism in Barcelona has been documented and reported by Transport and Environment, in which the city occupies the first position in cruise-related air pollution (followed by Palma de Mallorca and Venice). Another important detail about this answer is that it was consistent with the various statements made by Arran in their protest acts over the past years, emphasizing the link between global mass tourism and precarious work or the shortage of affordable (social) housing.
In the interview, Arran identified itself as an Independentist and left-wing organization, pointing out that their activism was not mainly oriented towards ‘mass tourism’, but that the industry was “one of the most evident contradictions” of the current capitalist system. When asked about the role that media plays in portraying the protest acts against mass tourism (in general and about Arran in specific), the spokesperson said that media (although not all) generally takes the side of the tourism industry:
Arran Spokesperson: It is also true that not all the media play this role… In the end, it depends on who they serve… But it is true that a big part of the media, in the end, they side with the status quo and the system… and therefore, any protest act that goes beyond a certain margin of… the social consensus… and that is a direct affront against the economic interests… Well, it exposes itself to this type of criminalization… by the media…
(Translation by the author)
Arran valued the use of digital channels and social media and considered it “an opportunity for the organization to decide which message communicates or not”, although these spaces are “not neutral”. This is relevant for the purposes of this paper because Arran was able to insert themselves in the mainstream media after posting their videos on their social media accounts, and they had the advantage to relatively shape the timing of the ‘news’ (while creating expectation). Moreover, Arran also opposed the ‘solutions’ proposed by local authorities and tourism stakeholders that were oriented towards reforming the current tourism management (i.e. those aiming at creating new tourist venues or attracting luxury tourism, etc.). On the contrary, the group insisted in the need to protect vulnerable groups and to campaign for tourism degrowth (“a change in the economic model”).
When asked about the violence used by the group in their protest acts, the spokesperson from Arran called into question the definition of ‘violence’, pointing out the political bias inherent in the concept:
Interviewer: Do you consider that the type of protest that you do is violent?
Arran Spokesperson: [SIGHS] In a way, I would say that… And considering the examples that we are talking about [THE ACTION INVOLVING THE SIGHTSEEING BUS AND THE LATER PROTESTS AT PARK GÜELL], I would not say violence, I think it is used in a biased manner. But it is also true that we want to antagonize this idea… that violence delegitimizes, but that the violence of the state, the violence of the system, is both tolerated and accepted. In the end, we are talking about who has the legitimate use, or legal [USE], of violence and… and… in the end… Violence could be a tool for the working and oppressed classes, against the system. And we don’t strictly condemn, in this sense, any action for the mere fact that it implies violence. But it is true that… when we talk about chaining ourselves to the dragon at Park Güell, clearly, we could not speak of violence… And, at the most, we are talking about actions that break the social consensus, and the social peace, and all that… It is easily labeled as violence. But we are talking about objects, so in that sense, no… (Translation by the author)
To conclude, Arran indicated that this ‘violence’ and ‘spectacular’ forms of protest was needed to capture media attention and promote social debate, although these protest tactics do not produce immediate or significant changes:
Arran Spokesperson: It is evident… I mean, in the end… The motive that it pursues… It is clear that sometimes this type of actions does not create a material change, at that precise moment… But what we have analyzed is that it allows us to put some topics on the table… and in the public agenda… that we could not have done in another way… I mean, if we stand one day with a banner in front of some place, maybe this does not reach the media… But the action of the sightseeing bus does, and it generates interest, and it comes out... It allows us to debate and talk about these issues. In this sense, yes, it manages to capture the attention. (Translation by the author)
This interview provided a needed insight into the ‘rationality’ of the young collective Arran, which is relevant for various reasons. First, the members of the collective – or at least their spokesperson – seem to be strategic in approach towards their acts of dissent, knowing what kind of tactics will work to attract the attention of both media and local or national authorities, which relates to the theory of both political and media opportunities. Following Meyer (2004: 128), by paying attention to the political context and the rules of the game (the structure), the members or Arran were able to decide their ‘violent’ and ‘creative’ tactics (the agency). Second, the protest acts were a series of events happening both within a city (in various neighborhoods in Barcelona) and in other places suffering similar side effects of global mass tourism (i.e. Mallorca, Bilbao, Valencia, etc.). As Cable (2016) has identified for groups protesting airport expansions and climate change, this strategy allows the protester to augment their media opportunities, which might help to keep political opportunities open.
From a spatial analysis (Parkinson, 2012), the protest acts by Arran challenged these sites of consumption (Routledge, 2017) that were also sites of assumption. They interrupted the logic of these spaces and used them for their dissent, aiming at re-signifying them as sites of destruction (of the local way of life, social ties through expulsion, etc.). A restaurant or a sightseeing bus might seem ‘neutral’ at first, but they ‘represent’ deeper societal changes that privilege a group of users (tourists) over other (local inhabitants). Although this spatial analysis is not part of the goal of this paper, it seems that Arran has planned each of their protest acts carefully, balancing costs and benefits and choosing sites that would help them to promote their cause (particularly evident in their protest act at Park Güell in 2018).
In relation to the alleged ‘violence’, ‘vandalism’ and even ‘trespassing’ of their protest acts, the notion of civil or democratic disobedience could be useful to analyze Arran’s ‘radical’ politics. There is a long debate about civil and democratic disobedience and their limits20 (Alakbarova, 2019; Celikates, 2016; Lefkowitz, 2007; Markovits, 2005), there are scholars who argue that these political actions should be ‘public’ and those who challenge this requirement, there are those who emphasize that protesters should be willing to accept punishment (for breaking the law) while others strongly oppose the idea of protesters being punished for trying to fix structural deficits within the democratic system. There is a range of interpretations on the legal use of ‘violence’ and on the definition of ‘radical’ politics. To some extent, the protest acts orchestrated by Arran since 2017 could be read as a form of civil or democratic disobedience, and as way to expand democracy and to (forcibly) include ‘disenfranchised’ voices in both opinion- and will-formation and decision-making processes.
